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This  note  describes  a  worked-out  example  of  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model  of  product  differentiation, 
generalized  in  two  directions;  career  choice  is  endogenous  and  firms  can  produce  many  products. 
1.  Introduction 
This  note  studies  a  version  of  the  Dixit  and  Stiglitz  (1977)  model  of 
product  differentiation,  generalized  in  two  respects.  Agents  are  allowed  to 
choose  their  occupations,  namely  to  be  either  workers  or  employers  (firms); 
and  firms  are  allowed  to  produce  more  than  one  commodity,  and  to  choose 
the  technique  of  production  of  each  commodity.  To  see  why  this  exercise 
might  be  of  some  interest,  recall  that  in  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model  variety  can 
be  over  or  undersupplied  in  equilibrium.  Firms  cannot  capture  all  the 
consumer  surplus  generated  by  the  introduction  of  new  products,  because 
they  cannot  perfectly  price  discriminate;  as  a  result,  variety  tends  to  be 
undersupplied  and  the  number  of firms  to  be  too  small  (there  is a one-to-one 
correspondence  between  products  and  firms).  At  the  same  time,  each  firm 
ignores  the  negative  externality  it  imposes  on  other  firms  when  it  decides  to 
enter  and  supply  a  new  product;  variety,  then,  tends  to  be  oversupplied  and 
the  number  of firms  to  be too  large. 
The  introductions  of  multiproduct  firms  breaks  the  link  between  extra 
variety  and  new  entry.  It  is  now  possible  to  increase  variety  without 
increasing  at  the  same  time  the  intensity  of  competition  (measured  by  the 
number  of  firms).  This  suggests  that,  ceteris  paribus,  allowing  for  multi- 
product  firms  will  result  in  more  variety.  What  is more,  multiproduct  firms 
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can  try  to  internalize  the  negative  intra-firm  externality  by  forcing  some  of 
their  rivals  to  exit  and,  at  the  same  time,  changing  their  product  range;  in the 
extreme  case  of  a  single  multiproduct  firm  serving  the  whole  market,  the 
negative  externality  is  completely  internalized.  On  the  other  hand,  though, 
there  are  now  new  forces  favoring  a  reduction  in  variety.  Each  firm 
introducing  a  new  product  has  to  consider  two  facts:  the  new  product  will 
reduce  demand  for  other  products  supplied  by  the  same  firm;  and  the 
resources  required  to  produce  the  new  product  could  have  been  used  to 
reduce  the  unit  cost  of  producing  existing  products.  Furthermore,  concen- 
tration  of production  in  the  hands  of fewer  firms  reduces  inefficiencies  due  to 
intra-firm  externalities  but  increases  inefficiencies  due  to  market  power;  and, 
by  increasing  profits,  concentration  invites  entry. 
The  purpose  of  the  exercise,  therefore,  is  to  find  out  the  relative  impor- 
tance  of  these  effects.  The  results  obtained  are  clear  cut,  due  to  the  stylized 
nature  of the  model;  for  the  same  reason,  though,  they  are  unlikely  to  survive 
unqualified  in less stylized  models. 
2.  The  model 
2.1.  Preferences  and  technology 
The  economy  consists  of  n identical  agents,  each  endowed  with  one  unit  of 
labor,  the  sole  primary  factor.  There  is a  continuum  of  final  goods,  and  the 
commodity  space  is (0, co). If c(t)  is the  consumption  level  of good  t, then 
U(c)=yc(t)“dt,  O<B<l, 
0 
is the  utility  level  of an  agent  who  consumes  c. 
The  main  feature  of  technology  in  this  model  is  that  there  is  a  menu  of 
techniques  that  can  be  used  in  the  production  of  each  commodity  t. 
Techniques  are  parameterized  by  the  amount  of  fixed  (labor)  cost  they 
involve.  To  produce  x(t)  units  of  good  t  with  technique  y(t)  takes 
y(t) +  Y(y(t))x(t)  units  of labor.  To  produce  a vector  x  of goods  with  a vector 
y of techniques  takes 
UY,  4 = 7  [r(t) + W(t))x(t)l dt, 
0 
(2) 
units  of labor. 
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Assumption  I  (A.1)  There  is  some  y>O  such  that  Ii/(y) is  finite  if y>‘y  and 
Y(y)=  +cc  if Osys;Y. 
This  assumption  implies  that  the  product  range  will  be  finite  in  finite 
economies,  with  length  bounded  by  n/r,  because  for  each  commodity 
produced  a  firm  has  to  pay  a  fixed  cost  greater  than  7.  $  is  twice 
continuously  differentiable,  strictly  decreasing  and  strictly  convex  on  (7, co). 
Furthermore,  we assume  the  following 
Assumption  2 (A.2) 
lim Y(y) =  + co,  lim  Y(y) = !Pm  >O. 
V'i  y-+m 
The  tradeoff  between  fixed  and  unit  variable  cost  is  captured  by  the 
assumed  negative  slope  of  $.  Strict  convexity  of  $  implies  that  the  cost 
function 
c(q)  = min  {Y  + yY(yM 
v20 
is well-defined  for  all  q >O.  The  fact  that  unit  variable  cost  is bounded  below 
by  a  positive  number  will  imply  that  prices  are  uniformly  bounded  away 
from  zero. 
Let  e(y)=  --y[Y’(y)/Y(y)]  be  the  elasticity  of  the  unit  variable  cost 
function. 
This  elasticity,  e, is strictly  decreasing  on  (7, co), and  another  assumption  is 
made. 
Assumption  3  (A.3) 
lim  e(y) =  + co,  lim  e(r) = c(. 
v+v+  y++m 
This  is a  diminishing-returns  type  of  assumption.  In  fact,  the  convexity,  of 
1,9  and  $,>O  imply  that  cc=O. 
Assumption  4  (A.4) 
Y(Y)  Y”(Y)  #  1 
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This  is a regularity  condition  that  will guarantee  uniqueness  of solutions  of 
a set  of equations  that  characterize  a firm’s optimal  plan. 
A pair  ($,/3)  that  satisfies  (A.l)-(A.4)  is given  by 
WY)  = yy, A, 
Y-Y 
y>?/,Yy,>o;  o<p<+. 
2.2.  Demand 
An  agent  with  income  M,  facing  a  vector  of  prices  p,  will  choose  a 
consumption  vector  c that  solves 
maxi  (~(t))~  dt, 
0 
subject  to  3 p( t)c( t) dt 5 M. 
0 
The  unique  solution  to  this  problem  is 
d(p, M)(t)  =  MP(t);;:;:-;;t. 
som  p(t)_ 
(3) 
(4) 
2.3.  Production  and entry  decisions 
Agents  play  a  game  in  two  stages.  In  the  first  stage,  they  choose  their 
occupation.  Those  that  choose  to  be employers  spend  their  labor  endowment 
in  setting  production  up  and  cannot,  therefore,  earn  income  in  the  second 
stage  by  selling  labor.  On  the  contrary,  those  that  choose  to  be  workers  can 
sell their  labor  endowment  to  employers  in  the  second  stage.  Let  B: Z-r{1,2} 
be  a  function  that  summarizes  first-stage  choices:  o(i) = 1 if i chooses  to  be  a 
worker,  o(i) =2  if  i chooses  to  be  an  employee.  Let  m(o)  be  the  number  of 
workers  at  0.  Note  that  if m(a)=0  or  m(o)=n  no  production  (or  consump- 
tion)  is possible.  We  set  all  payoffs  equal  to  zero  in  these  two  cases,  and  we 
proceed  to  the  second  stage  to  compute  payoffs  for  the  cases  0 5 m(o) 5 n -  1. 
In  the  second  stage,  employers  decide  on  what  to  produce,  how  to 
produce,  and  how  much  to  charge,  taking  demand  functions  and  first-stage 
decisions  as given.  We  assume  that  labor  has  no  disutility,  and  normalized  its 
price  to  unity.  Workers’  aggregate  demand  function  is  then  m(a) d(p, 1). On S.  Vassilakis,  Multiproduct  prms  153 
the  other  hand,  an  employer’s  income  equals  her  profits,  and  profits  depend 
on  demand  and  hence  on  employers’  income.  To  get  around  this  circularity, 
we  first  fix  each  employer’s  income  at  some  level  Yi, (a(i)=2),  and  then  we 
compute  the  second-stage  equilibrium  payoffs  fi( Y,, . . . , Y,  -,).  Finally,  we 
compute  equilibrium  income  levels  by  solving  the  fixed-point  equations 
F=A(Y,  ,...,  Y,-,),  o(i)=2. 
Each  employer  i chooses  a vector  pi of prices  and  a vector  yi of fixed  costs. 
Let  p=(pi:O(i)=2),  p(t)=min{p,(t);a(i)=2},  Y=C{y;cr(i)=2},  m=m(f~). 
Aggregate  demand  for  t is, by  eq. (4), 
W)(t)  = 4p, m  + Y)(t).  (5) 
How  is  the  demand  for  t  at  p  split  among  employers?  We  assume  that 
employer  i will attract  the  whole  demand  for  t  if no  other  employer  supplies 
t at  a finite  price,  but  that  i will attract  zero  demand  otherwise.  Formally 
MPN) = 
D(p)(t)  if  j # i implies  pj(t)  =  00, 
o  otherwise.  (6) 
Eq.  (6)  is  equivalent  to  ‘no-mill-price  undercutting’  in  the  terminology  of 
Hotelling  (1929),  Eaton  (1972)  and  Eaton  and  Lipsey  (1978),  or  to  ‘modified 
zero  conjectural  variations’  in  the  terminology  of  Novshek  (1980).  The  story 
behind  (6) is  that  each  firm  will  protect  its  market  area  Ai  = {t:pi(t)<  co} 
by  underselling  any  firm  j#  i that  tries  to  sell  t l  Ai(p)  at  a  price  lower  than 
Pdt).’ 
At the  aggregate  strategy  vector  (p, y),  then,  each  employer  i attains  payoff 
ZAP,  Y) = 7  CCPi(t) -  yY(Yi(t))I D&J,  t) -  Yi(  t)] dt* 
0 
(7) 
We  will  compute  the  symmetric  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  game2  defined 
by (7). A (second-stage)  equilibrium  (p, y)  us symmetric  if: 
‘Such  behavior  is  sometimes  observed:  Firms  advertise  ‘we  will  not  be  undersold’,  or  promise 
to  pay  consumers  ‘double  the  difference’  between  the  firm’s  price  and  any  competitor’s  (lower) 
price.  It  is  clearly  unsatisfactory,  though,  to  assume  such  behavior  rather  than  derive  it  from 
primitives.  I  was  unable  to  construct  a  model  that  does  this  and  stays  close  to  the  Dixit-Stiglitz 
formulation. 
‘It  is  more  convenient  to  let  firm  i choose  qi(t)  =//pi(t)  rather  than  p,(t).  The  strategy  space  of 
firm  i  is  the  set  of  pairs  (qi,yi)  where  qi=(O,  co)-+[O,  Y]  and  yi:(O,  co)-+[O,  co)  are  Lebesque 
integrable  functions.  Firm  i chooses  (qi,yi)  to  maximize  profits. 154  S. Vassilakis,  Multiproduct  firms 
(1)  Labor  supply  is equally  shared  by  firms 
%pi(r)Di(p,t)dt=m  if  a(i)=2; 
n-m 
(2)  each  firm offers the same degree  of variety 
~(Ai(p))=1(Aj@))  if  CT(i)=C(j)=2, 
where  I is the  Lebesque  measure. 
(8) 
(9) 
3.  Symmetric  Nash  equilibria 
The  symmetry  of  preferences  and  technology  implies  that  only  the  size  of 
market  areas  matters  (not  their  location  on  the  line)  and  that  all  goods  in  a 
firm’s market  area  will be  produced  with  the  same  technique  and  sold  at  the 
same  price.  The  no-mill-price  undercutting  assumption  implies  that  market 
areas  will be  disjoint.  We can  then  show  the  following. 
Fact  I.  For  each  1 srn  5  n-  1,  and  for  each  Y 20,  there  is  a  symmetric 
second-state  equilibrium  (*p,  *y).  It  is given  by 
*Ydt)  = 
i  if  tEAi( 
0  otherwise, 
(10) 
A(A_(*p))=  p,(m+  Y)(*-PM-m-11 
I  f(n-m)(n-m-p)  ’ 
^ Y’(P)  1-P 
-m=P’ 
*Pitt)  = 
if  t E Ai( 
otherwise. 




From  these  equations  and  (7)  we  can  compute  the  equilibrium  payoff  of 
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(1  -Mm+  Y) 
ni(y)=(n-m)(n_m-p).  (14) 
Finally,  recalling  the  definition  of  Y we solve  (n -  m)ni( Y) = Y and  we  obtain 
Y=[(l-jI?)m]/[n-m-l]. 
The  product  range  of each  firm  is then,  by  (1 l), 
p,m(l  -D) 
(n-m)?' 




The  equilibrium  utility  levels  for  workers  and  firms  are,  respectively, 
u,(m)  = U(d(*p,  l)), u,(m) = U(d(*p, *n(m)), or  equivalently, 






?  -  Y’(f)(n-m)(n-m-/I) 
(17) 
(18) 
We  can  now  go  to  the  first  stage  of  the  game  and  analyze  occupational 
choice.  Suppose  there  are  m  workers  in  (first-stage)  equilibrium.  A  worker 
will  not  switch  occupations  if his  utility  as  a  worker  (u,,.(m)) is greater  than 
his  utility  as  an  employer  (uf(m-  1)). An  employer  will  not  switch  occupa- 
tions  if  her  utility  as  an  employer  (u,(m))  is  greater  than  her  utility  as  a 
worker  (u,(m+  1)).  To  find  out  whether  such  an  m  exists,  let  B(m) = 
u,(m)/u,(m+  1). The  equilibrium  conditions  are  given  by 
B(m) 2  1,  B(m-  1) 5  1.  (19) 
By inspection  of (17) and  (18), and  by  (12) 
( 
41-P) 
B(m)=  (n-m)(n-m-8) 
n-m-1-b  B 
>  n-m-2  ’  (20) 
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two  fractions  inside  the  bracket  increases  in  m).  What  is  more,  B(n-2)  = 
+ co, and  B(2)<  1 for  n sufficiently  large.  Hence  the  following  is true. 
Fact  2.  For  all  sufficiently  large  n,  there  is  a  unique  equilibrium  number  of 
workers  m(n),  and  2 4  m(n) 5  n -  2. 
Clearly,  m(n)  is  the  smallest  integer  larger  than  the  unique  root  of  the 
equation  B(x) = 1. 
We  can  now  go  back  to  eqs.  (13), (15), (17)  and  (18) and  replace  m  by  its 
equilibrium  value  m(n).  The  resulting  expressions,  together  with  (10) and  (12), 
describe  the  symmetric  equilibrium.  To  see why  equilibrium  obtains,  fix m for 
a moment  and  go back  to  the  second  stage  of the  game.  Each  firm  can  spend 
the  labor  it  buys  in  three  different  ways:  To  expand  its  product  range,  to 
reduce  its  unit  variable  cost,  or  to  increase  the  quantities  supplied.  Because 
of  global  increasing  returns,  increasing  the  quantities  supplied  reduces  total 
average  costs,  but  eventually  demand  prices  decline  faster  than  average  costs. 
Increasing  the  product  range  increases  revenue  because  the  special  form  of 
the  utility  function  implies  that  consumers  are  willing  to  pay  a  lot  for  the 
first  few  units  of  a  new  good  [(ca)‘=  co if c =O],  but  it  also  raises  unit  costs, 
because  the  firm  produces  less  of  each  good,  and/or  invests  less  in  unit 
variable  cost  reduction.  In  equilibrium,  the  costs  of  change  exceed  the 
benefits. 
When  labor  supply  m  increases,  firms  increase  the  price-marginal  cost 
ratio  [eq.  (13)]  because  they  now  have  greater  market  power  vis-a-vis 
consumers;  and  expand  their  product  range  [eq.  (15)]  keeping  their  unit 
variable  costs  fixed  [eq.  (12)],  because  of  the  strong  preference  of  consumers 
for  variety.  This  is clearly  a special  result. 
We  now  look  at  the  entry  decision.  If  there  is  only  one  firm  (m=  n-  l), 
economies  of  scale  are  fully  exploited  and  intralirm  externalities  are  absent, 
but  the  firm  has  a  lot  of  market  power  [p/$  in  eq.  (13) is maximized  when 
m=  n-  l]  and  enjoys  a  high  level  of  utility  (t+  is  maximized  at  m = n-  1). 
Workers,  on  the  other  hand,  enjoy  zero  utility  [eq.  (17)].  There  is clearly  an 
incentive  to  enter.  On  the  other  hand,  when  there  is only  one  worker  (m=  l), 
firms  have  very  little  market  power  (p/tj  is minimized  when  m=  l), economies 
of  scale  are  dissipated,  and  firms  attain  a  low  utility  level  (ur  is  minimized 
when  m=  1). There  is clearly  an  incentive  to  exit.  In  equilibrium,  the  costs  of 
switching  occupations  exceed  the  benefits. 
4.  Asymptotic  properties  of equilibria 
The  main  result  in  this  section  is  that  the  ratio  of  workers  in  the 
population  converges  to  unity  as population  increases  to  infinity.  To  see this, S.  Vussilakis, Multiproduct  jrms  157 
let  y,=m(n)/n.  If  (y,)  does  not  converge  to  1,  it  contains  a  subsequence 
converging  to  some  ye  [0,  1). 
By (19), (y,)  must  satisfy 
Y,(l -B) 
n(l -y,)(l  -y,-b/n) 
l-Y"-u+B)l~>l 
1 -y,-22/n  =  . 
The  limit  of  the  left-hand  side  along  the  subsequence  is zero,  a  contradiction. 
Hence 
lim  m(n)  1  ---=.  (21) 
n+m  n 
The  number  of  firms  x, = n-m(n)  diverges  to  infinity  as  population 
increases  to  infinity.  For  if not,  (x,)  contains  a  bounded  subsequence;  if X is 
an  upper  bound,  then  2 5 x, s  X along  the  subsequence.  Then  the  equilibrium 
condition  B(m(n)  - 1) 50  yields 
m(n)  _  1  <(&I -  l)(X”  + 1)(X”  + 1  -PI  - 
(1  -m,-B)  . 
This  is  clearly  a  contradiction,  since  the  left-hand  side  diverges  to  infinity 
while  the  right-hand  side is bounded  along  the  subsequence.  Hence 
lim (n-m(n))=co.  (22) 
"_a, 
Combining  the  two  equilibrium  conditions  (19)  we  obtain  information 
about  the  speed  of convergence  of y, = m(n)/n. 
lim  ” 
1 
“+a  n(1 -y,)“=1--  (23) 
It  is  then  routine  to  check  that  as  market  size  n  increases  to  infinity,  the 
product  range  t  of each  firm  increases  to  infinity,  at  a rate  given  by 
(24) 
and  that  the  equilibrium  utilities  of  workers  and  employers  increase  to 
infinity,  while  their  ratio  converges  to  unity.  Finally  if  W, =m(n)l  is  total 158  S.  Vassilakis, Multiproduct  firms 
wage  income  and  IZ,=(n-m(n))~(m(n))  is  total  profit  income,  then  (16) 
implies 
(25) 
As market  size  n increases,  the  incentive  to  concentrate  production  (fuller 
exploitation  of  scale  economies  and/or  internalization  of  intratirm  externali- 
ties)  is  strengthened  relative  to  the  incentive  to  decentralize  production 
(avoidance  of  monopolistic  exploitation  due  to  firms’  market  power).  As  a 
result,  the  ratio  of employers  in population  declines.  The  strong  perference  of 
agents  for  variety  dictates  to  firms  to  spend  the  additional  labor  supply  to 
expand  their  product  range  rather  than  reduce  unit  costs.  What  is more,  the 
absolute  number  of  firms  has  to  increase,  because  if  there  was  an  upper 
bound  on  the  number  of  firms  their  profits  would  eventually  become  large 
enough  to  invite  entry.  The  special  form  of  the  utility  function  implies  that 
there  is  ‘room  for  entry’  if  uncumbent  profits  are  sufficiently  high,  because 
new  entrants  can  always  offer  new  varieties  and  compete  demand  away  from 
the  incumbents’  brands  (recall  that  direct  price  competition  is disallowed  by 
the  no-mill-price  undercutting  assumption).  Finally,  equilibrium  utilities  of 
workers  and  employers  are  asymptotically  equal  because  in  large  economies 
the  negative  effect  of  a  new  entrant  on  profits  is close  to  zero,  and  therefore 
workers  will not  switch  occupations  if and  only  if their  utility  is almost  equal 
to  the  utility  of  employers.  The  share  of  labor  in  total  income  converges  to 
unity  because  the  proportion  of  employers  in  population  approaches  zero 
and  employers’  income  is asymptotically  equal  to  workers’  income. 
5.  Efficiency  of  equilibria 
As  market-size  increases  to  infinity,  market  power  (price  over  marginal 
cost)  decreases  to  l//?  [see  eq.  (13)].  Firms  retain  some  market  power  in  the 
limit  because  of global  increasing  returns  to  scale; if p = MC  in the  limit  firms 
would  make  losses, and  exit  would  raise  prices  above  MC. 
To  check  whether  the  product  range  is  Pareto  optimal  in  large  finite 
economies,  we  compute  the  minimum  amount  of  labor  that  is  necessary  to 
allow  each  agent  to  enjoy  his/her  equilibrium  utility 
min?  y(t)+Y(y(t))  i  c,(t)  dt+l, 
0  i=l  1 
subject  to  7 (ci(t)P dtzu,(m(n))  if  o(i) = 1, 
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$(c,(t)Pdt~z+(m(n))  if  a(i)=2. 
By the  symmetry  of the  problem,  this  is equivalent  to  computing  a product 
range  6, a fixed  cost  y, and  two  consumption  levels  c,,,,cr to 
min L = S(y + Y(y)(mc,  + (n -  m)c,)) + 1, 
subject  to  6& = u,(m(n)), 
bc,p  = u&n(n)). 
The  solution  of this  minimization  problem  is 
y=s,  (26) 
,=+w  -4  ___- 
9  ’ 
(27) 
and  the  minimized  value  of  the  objective  function  is  L,=m(n)  + 1, while  the 
welfare  loss due  to  imperfect  competition  is 
n-L,=n-m(n)-  1.  (28) 
Hence,  finite  economies  are  inefficient  because  there  are  too  many  firms  in 
equilibrium  (each  paying  an  entry  fee equal  to  its  owner’s  labor  endowment), 
while  efficiency  dictates  production  by  a  sigle  firm,  to  fully  exploit  scale 
economies.  While  the  total  welfare  loss  increases  to  infinity  with  market  size, 
the  per  capita  loss  converges  to  zero  because  the  ratio  of  employers  to 
population  converges  to  zero.  On  the  other  hand,  the  product  range  is 
Pareto  efficient  in  large  finite  economies  [compare  (26)  and  (27)  with  (10) 
and  (15)].  This  is  a  special  result,  but  it  does  indicate  that  allowing  for 
multiproduct  firms  can  make  a  difference  in  the  efficiency  conclusions  one 
draws  from  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model.  Similar  asymptotic  results  were 
obtained  by  Guesnerie  and  Hart  (1985) and  Ushio  (1985). 
6.  Concluding  remarks 
This  note  has  extended  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model  of  product  differentiation 
in  two  directions:  Career  choice  is  endogenous  and  firms  are  allowed  to 
produce  more  than  one  product.  We  have  obtained  an  equilibrium  existence 
result  and  we have  explicitly  described  the  symmetric  equilibrium.  As market 160  S.  Vassilakis,  Multiproduct  firms 
size  increases  to  infinity,  the  ratio  of  employers 
capital  welfare  loss, converge  to  zero. 
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